

The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation¹

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Abstract: While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For these reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation.

Keywords: anger, argument, emotion, epistemology, practical reasoning.

Anger may be the enemy of reason. It cannot, all the
same, come into being except where there is a place for
reason.
Seneca (*De Ira*, 21)

When we turn from anger we turn from insight, saying
we will accept only the designs already known, deadly
and safely familiar.
Audre Lorde (*Sister Outsider*, 131)

Introduction

In this paper, we provide a new view of the epistemic benefits of anger in argumentation. Drawing on research showing that anger can operate as a positive epistemic force, we chart paths for anger to assist people in achieving a clearer understanding of the content of arguments. We also suggest ways that anger can help reasoners – both participants in and observers of argument – to increase their accuracy in identifying the purposes argumentation serves. Attending to the complexity and significance of these functions of anger can benefit both arguers and arguments.

We begin with an exploration of different accounts of ‘anger’ to set the parameters for our discussion. We address various arguments against the moral and epistemic influence of anger followed by arguments that show it can have moral and epistemic value. To support our view that anger has greater epistemic

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value in argumentation than is often recognized, we draw on research in philosophy of emotion, moral psychology, psychology, and feminist studies. We explore the potential for emotion to support the epistemological functions of argumentation, suggesting that this contribution can be aided especially through what Douglas Walton (1992) describes as the “maieutic effect.” The maieutic effect concerns the way that argumentation processes – the exchange of reasons, questions, and responses – bring new ideas to light. In that way, argument functions like a midwife, he suggests, helping to birth “personal insights that deepen one’s understanding of one’s own position [on] an issue” (Walton 1992, 220). The perspective that develops regarding oneself and the audience generates knowledge of the arguers, the context and functions of argumentation, and the world in which the arguers operate. In the case of anger, the maieutic effect extends to the very content of arguments, we suggest, insofar as it enables the identification of implicit reasons and assumptions.

What Is Anger?

In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle famously defines anger as “a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one’s friends” (Aristotle 1984a, 1378a31-33). In this account, anger has a cognitive component consisting in the belief that one has been unjustly slighted and corresponding thoughts of revenge. Anger can also be calmed by a change in beliefs, such as when a person finds out that the one who made them angry did so involuntarily, or that they are “much distressed at what they have done” (Aristotle 1984a, 1380b32-33). Aristotle’s account also draws attention to the psychological and physiological feelings associated with anger. People find slights painful and take pleasure in the corresponding “expectation of revenge” (Aristotle 1984a, 1378a4). Anger thus has “compositional intricacy” for Aristotle, comprising “body and mind, cognition and desire, perception and feeling” (Price 2010, 140).

The “compositional intricacy” of anger also appears in contemporary accounts. Although anger is considered to be one of six basic pan-cultural emotions (Ekman 1992) – and is thus arguably quite “hard-wired” in the human brain – anger is neither a clearly delineated natural kind nor does it have immunity to reason. Although anger often feels very automatic and resistant to rationality – features which suggest that anger is modular – there are excellent reasons to doubt that emotions are strongly modular in nature (De Sousa 2006; Russell 2006). Most contemporary accounts of emotion hold that emotions involve a complex blend of physiological responses, feelings, patterns of behavior, motivations, beliefs, perceptions, and judgements, which are amenable to change through rational influence (De Sousa 1987, 2010; Greenspan 1988; Griffiths 1997; Nussbaum 2001; 2016). Moreover, the interaction of anger with other feelings, emotions, desires, moods, thoughts, imaginings, beliefs, intentions, character traits, and various physical states makes for a great variety of possible

experiences of anger. Considering that the evolutionary purpose of anger likely relates to the need to signal the emergence of conflict that requires resolution (DiGiuseppe and Tafrate 2007, 16), and that conflict comes in many shapes and sizes, it makes sense that anger should be variable and flexible. Any account of anger in practical reasoning should therefore attend to various distinct forms of anger and their sensitivity to context.

Another complication for any definition of anger arises from the need to distinguish between anger and its expression because the expression of anger does not provide a truly reliable guide to either the presence or intensity of anger (DiGiuseppe and Tafrate 2007). Anger can be expressed in very different ways; for example, it can be expressed through silence, stonewalling, glancing, shouting, passive aggression, physical violence, and even smiling. Our personal history and cultural context shape how we express anger, so such factors must also be taken into account (DiGiuseppe and Tafrate 2007). This variability of expression can make it challenging to identify anger or determine its degree in any given exchange or argument.

To add further to the complexity of anger, Owen Flanagan (2018) identifies a variety of different *types* of anger. “Payback anger,” arises when people seek to harm those who have harmed them (Flanagan 2018, xvi). “Recognition respect anger,” seeks to restore personal status after a slight (xvi). “Pain-passing anger,” involves causing others pain because one is in pain, “but not pain that [they] caused” (xvi). “Instrumental anger,” involves the desire that others will provide a remedy (xvi). “Feigned anger” is used manipulatively to gain agreement (xvi). “Political or institutional anger” focuses on changing “social policies or laws or structures that are unfair, racist, sexist, or otherwise harmful and dehumanizing” (xvi). Finally, “impersonal anger” involves feelings of “horror and fury at the heavens, nature, human evil, or folly” (xvi). Flanagan further identifies three “spheres” of anger: the “personal” that comprises anger at “family and friends”; the “communal” that directs anger at “communal and commercial relations”; and the “political” that involves anger at “politics and institutions of government” (xvi).

The complexity of anger surely provides a key reason for Aristotle’s care in addressing the difficulty of managing anger virtuously. In discussing moral excellence in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle says,

any one can get angry – that is easy – or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right aim, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; that is why goodness is both rare and laudable and noble. (Aristotle 1984b, 1109a26-29)

Aristotle thus places many conditions on anger for the virtuous person. In the *Rhetoric* he also addresses the conditions that give rise to calmness, for calmness is “the opposite of anger” (Aristotle 1984a, 1380a5-6). This is significant, as Flanagan notes, for Aristotle’s truly virtuous person is even-tempered and more inclined to forgiveness than revenge (Flanagan 2018, xvii). Given the constraints

Aristotle places on anger, and his view that virtuous people are gentle, occasions for virtuous anger presumably will be relatively uncommon.

The Epistemic Case against Anger

Anger has a well-established reputation for its negative effects on moral and interpersonal relationships as well as judgement, perception, and rationality. Everyday experience clearly shows that when people “see red” they often behave very poorly and appear to others as beyond the scope of rational persuasion. Skepticism about the moral and epistemic value of anger is therefore quite justified. Insofar as argumentation tends to be lauded for providing a reasonable alternative to violence and coercion, it is often taken to substitute reason for various emotional responses but especially for the anger that motivates retribution. Reason has provided one of the central means for managing or eliminating anger that philosophers have recommended throughout history and across cultures.

Ancient Greek Stoics, for example, advise the elimination of anger, for in their view the beliefs and judgements that cause anger invariably prove wrongheaded upon later reflection. In later Roman Stoicism, Seneca similarly advises us to eliminate anger, for “it is easier to exclude the forces of ruin than to govern them, to deny them admission than to moderate them afterwards” (*De Seneca* 1995, 25, I, 7, 2-3). Similar approaches to anger also crop up in ancient and contemporary Buddhist philosophy. The *Dhammapada*, one of the texts of the Pali Canon, counsels that the wise person will control anger and respond instead with love. In a contemporary Buddhist context, Thich Nhat Hanh (2001) counsels us to respond to anger with compassion and search for and correct the ignorance and wrong perceptions at its root.

Perhaps the most in depth contemporary western philosophical version of the view that anger always proves “normatively problematic, whether in the personal or public realm” comes from Martha Nussbaum (2016, 5). She reasons that anger always includes some notion of payback, although it may be very subtle. The payback sought through anger proves normatively problematic in two respects. First, even though the injured party may feel that payback will correct a moral harm, it will not. It is a mistake to think that “the suffering of the wrongdoer somehow restores, or contributes to restoring, the important thing that was damaged” (Nussbaum 2016, 5). Second, although payback may effectively improve our relative status after being wronged, Nussbaum argues that “it is normatively problematic to focus exclusively on relative status, and that type of obsessive narrowness, though common enough, is something we ought to discourage in both self and others” (Nussbaum 2016, 6). With regard to relative personal status, Nussbaum takes a Stoic approach: “if people are secure, they won’t see an injury as a diminishment” (Nussbaum 2016, 26).

Although Nussbaum grants that anger may have some limited usefulness as a “*signal* to self and/or others that wrongdoing has taken place, as a source of

motivations to address it, and as a *deterrent* to others, discouraging their aggression" overall, she advises finding better routes to those goods (Nussbaum 2016, 6). Anger can serve the practical purpose of protecting self-respect, identifying wrongdoing, and fighting injustice, but it remains normatively inappropriate. "Nor," she says, "is it as useful, even in these roles, as it is sometimes taken to be" (Nussbaum 2016, 6).

Anger can also constitute the enforcement of oppressive social structures, such as Kate Manne (2018) observes about misogyny, in which case it has a serious tendency to mislead people in their reasoning. Manne takes "misogyny's primary function and constitutive manifestation [to be] the punishment of 'bad' women, and policing of women's behavior" (Manne 2018, 192). Misogyny includes outrage at women though not necessarily hatred of women in general (an older view evincing some psychological naivety). Specific women become subject to misogyny, she suggests, when they deviate from nurturing roles and thus seem to wrong other people considered entitled to women's support (Manne 2018, 90). The violation of these norms includes when women themselves seek support, and that demand to place a woman at the centre of the story can trigger misogyny against her (Manne 2018, 225, 236). "From the perspective of the dominant, the people they mistreat are often far from innocent. On the contrary, they are often tacitly – and falsely – held to be deeply guilty" (Manne 2018, 157).² Insofar as people have no right to women's caring labour, misogyny has no basis in truth, making misogynistic anger epistemically dysfunctional. Analogous obstacles to knowledge will arise regarding other axes of oppression, where anger responds to deviation from other sorts of subordinate roles.

A considerable body of contemporary research in psychology seems to support the approach to anger we find in Manne, Nussbaum, the Stoics, and some Buddhist accounts. For instance, psychologists have found that anger can "dangerously alter perceptions of risk," "distort likelihood estimates," "place an attentional premium on anger-related information," "decrease trust," "increase stereotyping and prejudice," and "trigger hostility and aggression" (Moons and Mackie 2007, 706). To argue that anger has a proper and rightful place in rational persuasion, at least as traditionally-conceived, thus seems to conflict with widely-held beliefs as well as some scientific evidence and liberatory politics.

However, recognizing that people are susceptible to anger, and that anger may occasionally be "genuinely rational and normatively appropriate," Nussbaum argues for a concept called "*Transition-Anger*, whose entire content is: 'How outrageous. Something should be done about that'" (Nussbaum 2016, 6). Transition-anger is "forward looking" in the sense that "a reasonable person

² The dominant perspective may also be maintained by other women who envy the attention (Manne 2018, 229) or simply seek to maintain the social order.

shifts [from anger] toward more productive forward-looking thoughts, asking what can actually be done to increase either personal or social welfare" (Nussbaum 2016, 6). Nussbaum's notion of transition-anger here resembles Emily McRae's (2015) account of anger which draws on the Tantric Buddhist view that one can "metabolize" anger, that is, transform anger into morally efficacious "nourishment" that avoids destructiveness (McRae 2015, 466, 472). In metabolizing anger, one shifts the energy of the anger away from harm and towards helping oneself or others. McRae says that the "presence of an overarching deeply ingrained, caring orientation (*bodhicitta*) distinguishes tantric anger from normal anger" (McRae 2015, 474).

The historical accounts of Stoics and Buddhists, and many contemporary accounts such as that of Nussbaum, make the case that people should eliminate anger because of the moral and epistemic havoc that it creates for individuals and communities. Nevertheless, Nussbaum's transition-anger and McRae's metabolized-anger suggest that anger need not be eliminated or repressed. Rather, it is what we do when anger arises that counts. And this raises a question regarding the extent to which these accounts really differ from Aristotle's position that people can experience anger virtuously in select circumstances. Consider that Aristotle's term for anger – *orgê* – has a more limited meaning than the Western concept of "anger," referring only to "the species of revenge-desiring anger that comes from contempt, spite, and arrogant abuse" (Flanagan 2018, xvii). Given the downranking involved in these forms of slighting, Flanagan argues that *orgê* must depend on "cultural knowledge about status and hierarchy, about "who is not fit to slight one or one's own" (Flanagan 2018, xvii). In his view, the intention behind the desire for revenge in Aristotle's account is not to secure a bad consequence for the offender, but to reestablish one's status or worth.

Flanagan thus argues for the classification of Aristotle's *orgê* as "recognition respect anger," rather than as "payback anger" (Flanagan 2018, xviii). Recognition respect anger, like transition or metabolized anger, seeks to rectify a situation rather than engage in payback. As Trudy Govier argues, it seems that anger can operate without a desire for revenge (Govier 2002, 14). The idea that there may be constructive, virtuous uses of anger therefore seems quite plausible.

It is also relevant that Aristotle's discussion of anger in the *Rhetoric* takes place within a broader discussion of the character traits that inspire confidence in an orator, such as good sense, excellence, and goodwill (Aristotle 1984a, 1378a9). These character traits are important for building trust with audiences and serve to moderate the influence of emotions on the judgements of orator and audience. This is important given that for Aristotle, emotions "are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements" (Aristotle 1984a, 1378a21-22). Aristotle begins his discussion of emotion and rhetoric with an examination of anger, which makes sense given the particular power of anger in oratory. Anger can easily sway an audience for good or ill and so knowing how to

ignite or calm anger provides an important oratory skill. Aristotle instructs that “we must discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and on what grounds they get angry with them” (Aristotle 1984a, 1378a24-26).

It is our view that Aristotle’s instructions are worth greater consideration, for they reveal a good deal about the complexity of anger, its epistemic value, and its potential to enhance argumentation. While payback and pain-passing anger seem rather straightforwardly problematic both morally and epistemically, this is not clearly the case for recognition-respect anger, political anger, and instrumental anger. These angers do not necessarily involve the desire that bad consequences come to others and they may well *begin* at the ‘transition’ or ‘metabolizing’ stage. The desire accompanying anger could, for example, be a strong desire for the peaceful resolution of an injustice.

In light of the above considerations, to make the case that anger can have epistemic value in argumentation we focus principally on recognition respect anger, instrumental anger, and political and institutional anger, all of which involve goals beyond revenge. Also, because anger arises for complex social and cultural reasons and interconnects with many conscious, unconscious, and biological processes, we consider the door open for a broad interpretation of its nature. We are mindful that anger may well present differently in arguments depending on the ‘spheres’ it involves, and whether those spheres are distinct or overlapping. We consider anger to be more involved than a superficial reading of Aristotle’s revenge account at first suggests and hold that mistakes about anger’s value in argumentation, as well as the neglect of the topic in argumentation theory, trace in part to an overly simplified understanding of anger. This is an understanding we hope to correct as it applies to argumentation.

The Epistemic Case for Anger

At a basic level, anger has epistemic relevance because it arises in response to information about harm, frustration, or disrespect, and it ceases when the issue becomes resolved. The circumstances in which anger arises, however, are often quite complex and the cause of anger is not always immediately transparent. Additionally, the causes of anger arising from systemic and institutional injustice may be very difficult to identify from within those systems and institutions. Anger may thus resist resolution not because it is irrational, but because a reasoner failed to identify the correct source of the anger or determine the best way to address it. These pose significant considerations for any investigation into the epistemology of anger.

Consider a case wherein a person provides a set of reasons for their beliefs that are rational and objective in light of what they have accepted about reality, but those beliefs clash with the emotion they experience. This discordant emotion then nags until a re-examination of the situation discovers that the emotion was ‘right’ all along. This type of experience leads Sabine Döring to

regard emotions as “an indispensable source of practical knowledge” (Döring 2010, 283). She gives the example of Mark Twain’s character Huckleberry Finn who, acting on his sympathy for Jim, helps Jim to escape from slave hunters. In the novel, Huck’s sympathy does not align with his rational judgement that he should have turned Jim in. Only later does Huck realize that his sympathy – which persists all the while he believes he acted against his “rational” judgement – was right all along: it would have been wrong to turn in Jim.

Examples like this show, Döring argues, that emotions have a “cognitive power” equivalent to reason and judgement that can guide people when they erroneously believe their reasoning is cogent. To serve this *rational* role, “emotions must be beyond the agent’s guidance and control” (Döring 2010, 297). That is, they must persist long enough for us to uncover their rationale and respond. The “ongoing cultivation of one’s practical reasons through discovering new reasons and improving one’s existing reasons” depends on emotions (Döring 2010, 296). On this view, anger provides a cognitive perception equivalent in its power with judgement and reason and is of a nature to persist until resolved. Anger in this sense functions rather like the epistemic feeling of doubt, which has a similarly persistent nature and drives us to seek resolution.

Anger demonstrates epistemic value as it regularly signals for people that they are being harmed, devalued, or blocked in their objectives and persists until the problem is resolved. This provides some explanation for why work on social injustice, particularly gender and intersectional oppression, frequently demonstrates the epistemic value of anger (Adichie 2012; Burrow 2010; Campbell 1994; Cherry 2018; Donner 2002; Frye 1983; Gilligan 1990; hooks 1996; Jaggard 1989; Leboeuf 2018; Lorde 1984; Lugones 1987; Manne 2018; McRae 2018; McWeeny 2010; Meyers 2004; Narayan 1988; Spelman 1989; Tessman 2005). As Audre Lorde argues, anger “is loaded with information and energy” and can be used for the “hard work of excavating honesty” about unjust personal, social, political, and institutional experiences (Lorde 1984, 127-128). Anger can also help people to increase their knowledge of personal agency, self-worth, and oppressive structures, as well as provide epistemic resources for determining how to address problems that threaten their agency and worth (McWeeny 2010, 295-296). Without anger, reasoners are at greater risk of accepting false stereotypes and unjust treatment, particularly if it aligns with other false views about them in the cultural web of belief. Anger encourages the pursuit of truth. Anger can also help distinguish those with whom we can debate about differences from those “who are our genuine enemies” and will not take up our reasons or issues (Lorde 1984, 127).

Anger can also improve people’s perception of the social and political world. Emotions like anger affect what reasoners pay attention to and can make previously unnoticed features of reality salient. Alison Jaggard argues that “outlaw emotions” such as anger can “enable us to perceive the world differently than we would from its portrayal in conventional descriptions. They may provide the first

indications that something is wrong with the way alleged facts have been constructed" (Jaggar 1989, 161). Maria Lugones argues further that anger can make travel possible between mainstream worlds where an "arrogant perception" structures the ignorance of "outsiders," and worlds where "loving perception" makes power relations and their effects transparent (Lugones 1987, 3, 18). As epistemic "world travellers," oppressed reasoners can gain new understanding of the mainstream worlds and what they hide, as well as ideas for new possible worlds (Lugones 1987, 18). World travelers also learn more about their own subjectivity as they shift subjectivities between worlds.

While anger can lead to knowledge of social injustice and its effects, those who are oppressed are less likely to have their anger taken seriously (see, for instance Manne 2018 on "himpathy"). This issue is not only moral, but also epistemic in nature. Kathryn Norlock, for example, argues that uptake from others and affirmation from audiences is necessary for gaining understanding through the expression of anger (Norlock 2009, 83). Anger also links, as Marilyn Frye argues, to recognizing that one has "a claim to a domain – a claim that one is a being whose purposes and activities require and create a web of objects, spaces, attitudes and interests that is worthy of respect, and that the topic of this anger is a matter rightly within that web" (Frye 1983, 87). For Frye, the expression of anger depends on certain social preconditions, and "requires and involves a certain cooperation from the other party... If the second party's "uptake" is not forthcoming, the relation... collapses. Your speech just hangs there – embarrassed, unconsummated" (Frye 1983, 88-89). Anger is silenced and, as Myisha Cherry (2018) notes, that silencing constitutes a kind of epistemic injustice or violence that "disappears" knowledge (Spivak 1998; Dotson 2011). Rejecting the anger of others suppresses knowledge, "by making it the case that certain groups cannot be heard. Such ignorance can be harmful, for the angry agents' courage or agency has now been undermined. This is an epistemic error made by the anger evaluator" (Cherry 2018, 60).

The epistemic concerns associated with failures to acknowledge and consider the anger of others makes clear that anti-anger approaches to argumentation also carry significant moral risks. As McRae argues, it can be difficult to distinguish the "extirpation of anger from its repression or suppression" (McRae 2018, 109) and the extirpation of anger is very problematic for members of oppressed groups. She argues that because

anger is at least in part communicative, happens in relationship, and requires some form of uptake, and since the uptake of oppressed people's anger is routinely denied, oppressed people are faced with an extremely difficult psychological and moral task: How to abandon one's anger with moral integrity in a society that did not take seriously one's anger in the first place? (McRae 2018, 109)

Given this, any theory of argumentation that does not recognize the constructive epistemological and moral value of anger in argumentation risks encouraging an oppressive standard that results in the loss of knowledge of the world.

The view that anger has epistemic benefits for reasoning also receives support from an increasing body of research in psychology. Wesley Moons and Diane Mackie, for example, found that anger can enhance rather than detract from analytic information processing involving “effortful, deliberate, and meticulous scrutiny and evaluation of information” (Moons and Mackie 2007, 706). They found that the responses of angry people and their actions can be “the result of quite clear-minded and deliberative processing” (Moons and Mackie 2007, 718). These findings counter the assumption that anger principally involves fast, nonanalytic forms of cognitive processing such as heuristics and stereotyping. In another study, Jimmy Calanchini, Moons, and Mackie (2016) found that persuasive appeals accompanied by expressions of anger increased analytic processing and helped override nonanalytic processing in the recipients. Recipients were also more likely to prefer strong arguments over weak arguments when anger was expressed. The authors theorize that because anger poses a threat, recipients are more likely to think deeply about persuasive appeals expressed with anger than they would otherwise. They also observe that emotions like anger “may signal that something is wrong in the environment and, consequently, motivate careful scrutiny” (Calanchini, Moons, and Mackie 2016, 89).

Anger has also been found beneficial for reaching compromises during negotiation, provided that negotiations are taking place in a context with low levels of hatred. Eran Halperin and colleagues (2011) found that inducing anger in groups with low levels of hatred towards an outgroup resulted in increased levels of support for reaching compromises with that outgroup. They also note that anger can contribute to improved intergroup relations, increased awareness of out-group heterogeneity, long-term reconciliation, and risk taking in negotiations (Halperin et al. 2011, 284). By contrast, inducing anger in groups with a high level of hatred towards an outgroup reduces support for reaching a compromise. These studies suggest that some of the negative effects on moral and epistemic value that people normally attribute to anger may actually stem from hatred.

Anger in Argumentation Theory

These various considerations about anger convince us of its epistemological value and lead us to consider how it affects reasoning that takes place in argumentation. If arguing practices can help arguers to use anger wisely, they might limit anger’s disruption of reasoning processes and contribute to greater learning through argumentation. The dialogical contexts that include the expression of anger cannot be adequately captured by the monological model of an argument as a premise-inference-conclusion complex, and we find helpful the

dialogical account of “argument” as “an invitation to an inference” proposed by Robert C. Pinto (2001). When one offers an argument, there may be a hope to persuade the audience, but there may be other goals for the proposed inference too. The larger discursive context in which people argue, the dialectical models, and the rhetorical techniques people use all belong under the term “argumentation.” Sometimes an occurrence or a piece of dialogical argumentation may be called an “argument” too, and such segments of argumentation can include premise-inference-conclusion complexes.

Our main claims are that anger can serve the operation of reasoning in argumentation and that argumentation provides useful ways to process anger. To support these claims, we first review some of the treatments of emotion in argumentation theory. Theorists such as Michael Gilbert, Dale Hample, and Douglas Walton have noted positive roles that emotions play in argumentation. While they have not focused on anger and or particularly recognized its epistemological potential, their accounts suggest how the role of anger in argumentation might be better understood. We then focus specifically on anger in argumentation, and show that anger, properly managed, may be of considerable value to argumentation, since epistemological values such as truth, empirical accuracy, and understanding often figure among the express purposes for arguing. Even when the main purpose of arguing does not lie in determining the truth or the most justified belief, argumentation tends to have a maieutic effect. That may result from a focus on content that distinguishes argumentation stylistically from other forms of discourse: “[e]ven when the primary interaction goals are identity, dominance, or something other than issue resolution, the conversation plays out in terms of content” (Hample 2012, 165). Focusing on content involves the critical doubt that Walton suggests moves argumentation forward, and that movement can draw out the meaning in anger and allow arguers to learn from it.

Emotion in Argumentation

Argumentation helps us to address disagreement, whether understood in the minimal sense of reluctance to accept a claim or as a stronger opposition such as taking up a contrary position. Traditionally argumentation theorists treat disagreement and strong opposition as strictly logical relations between claims or propositional viewpoints, neglecting the likelihood of attendant personal conflict. Isolating disagreement by addressing only the logical opposition certainly can simplify the processes of argumentation in order to make people’s goals more attainable. Sometimes people want to bracket off the complexities of social relationships to progress on one particular point of contention, a focus that the complexity of emotion and the forcefulness of anger can undermine. Much can be missed, however, in argumentation that assumes all relevant information has been made explicit. Moreover, although the expression of

emotion can conflict with the goals of argumentation, it can also provide information relevant to sorting out and achieving those goals.

Late twentieth century scholarship on persuasion tends to treat emotions in general as weapons, not elements of communication deserving respect. Emotion was mostly ignored or treated only as an impediment to reasoned argumentation and a source of skepticism because the historical study of argumentation focused on written texts and speeches. Even since the 1970s surge of interest in interpersonal argument, studies tend to set emotional aspects aside (Hampe 2012).

Yet, emotions account for multiple dimensions of argumentation. As Hampe explains:

Emotions contextualize arguments, instigate them, disguise them, interpret them, guide them, and resolve them. The understanding of what people are doing when they argue is probably more traceable to feelings about arguments than to any amount of formalized knowledge about them. (Hampe 2012, 174)

To ignore emotion in argument, Gilbert advises, is “to forget that one is arguing with a human being” (Gilbert 1997b). To ignore this in actual arguments or in argumentation scholarship (a tendency he calls “neo-logicism”) sacrifices the potential for rich communication that encourages “a deep understanding of mutual positions and standpoints” (Gilbert 1997b).

What attention there has been to the role of emotions in argumentative reasoning focuses largely on fallacies and associated argumentation schemes. Because emotional appeals have such force, they can play too great a role in argumentation and may gain an undeserved weight in reasoning, thus constituting fallacies. Walton associates four argumentation schemes with emotion: *ad baculum* or appeal to force, *ad populum* or appeal to popular sentiment, *ad misericordiam* or appeal to pity, and *ad hominem* or personal attack. Each of the four, Walton (1992) suggests, relies on what the arguer takes to be deeply held emotional commitments of the audience, especially commitments to their own personal interests. As for other fallacies, an appeal to emotion derives credibility from invoking an accepted inferential scheme in these cases playing to personal interest (Walton 2010). Any scheme can be invoked in the wrong place or the wrong fashion in an unreparable way deserving to be diagnosed as a fallacy.

However, the audience’s personal agendas can be perfectly reasonable bases for argumentative appeal, enhancing the salience of the reasoning offered. Each argumentation scheme associated with the fallacy name can be acceptable in certain circumstances. In the case of *ad baculum*, the type of dialogue, “negotiation,” circumscribes the appropriateness of the appeal, but the other schemes typical of “persuasion” dialogue may tend to become fallacious even within dialogue type. Showing that a claim or emotion has relevance to the specific persuasion dialogue depends on supporting premises particular to a type of appeal, and requires that the arguer address questions regarding that

support: In *ad populum*, might the received view track the truth? In *ad misericordiam*, is sympathy relevant to evaluating a student's grade? In *ad hominem*, do a person's failings affect the validity of their claims? Generally, do those emotionally loaded observations relate significantly to the matter under discussion? Do they deserve as much attention as they receive?

When knowledge provides a goal for argumentation then emotional appeals provide room for skepticism, but Walton's account of presumptive argumentation schemes shows that appeals to emotion can play positive roles in argumentative reasoning too. He presents the proper function of argumentation schemes as depending on a dialogical context that has specific purposes, such as resolving disagreement in "persuasion" dialogue or "critical discourse," or in planning to exchange resources in negotiation dialogue. For instance, the *ad baculum* argument, characterized by an appeal to force, threat, or fear, can be appropriate in negotiation dialogue but not in persuasion dialogue, because of their different value orientations. In negotiation dialogue matters of truth and falsity play a secondary role, and the main purpose lies in the exchange of some kind of goods or items of value, including personal actions and behaviour. *Ad baculum* appeals have no place, however, in persuasion dialogue, which includes pragma-dialectical "critical discussion" in which people use argument to resolve disagreement. Walton's persuasion dialogue involves disagreement, but it may succeed even without resolving that disagreement so long as the process has a maieutic effect and those involved learn something about their background assumptions (Walton 1998, 30-31, 48-49).

Emotions take on a more extensive and broadly valuable role in Gilbert's multi-modal approach to argumentation that can be used to analyze any argument. The emotional mode of analysis that he recognizes operates alongside the logical mode for viewing argumentation, well developed over centuries by scholars, along with two further wholly or partly non-logical modes, namely the visceral and kisceral modes. Gilbert associates the emotional mode broadly with feelings, the visceral mode with physical and contextual elements, and the kisceral mode with spiritual and intuitive concerns. Some expressions in one mode may translate into others while others may not be translatable. Many arguments will reflect more than one mode, and "an argument, then, may be wholly or partially in a particular mode when its claim, data, warrant, and/or backing is drawn from that particular mode" (Gilbert 1997a, 80).

Gilbert's multi-modal account makes especial sense in his coalescent model of argumentation, which measures the success of an argument in terms of the development of mutual understanding. Each mode provides a different kind of strength to an argument and may in fact dominate the function of the argument so much that some arguments fall into types distinguished by modes. There can thus be emotional arguments in which the emotional mode dominates (Gilbert 1997a, 93-99).

The modes of arguing, however, are not the same as the goals of argument that Gilbert also recognizes to fall into different types. “Task goals” form the immediate strategic object of the encounter whereas “face goals” concern the relationship among participants, including their continued engagement in the argument. Each influences the other and, further, both types can be affected by an individual person’s psychological motives that overarch and guide strategic and face goals (Gilbert 1997a, 67-68). Such goals, however, need not be explicit to have an influence on argumentation:

Goals can be hidden from the person who holds them. We can be unknowingly self-destructive or self-defeating. We can be provocative or antagonistic without realizing that we are trying to evoke a particular reaction. We can think we are doing one thing for one reason only to realize later, with or without help, that we were completely wrong. (Gilbert 1997a, 69)

Bringing into awareness one’s own goals and those of others in the argument thus provides a central technique of “coalescent argumentation.” The development of understanding about goals helps to draw people into agreement by conjoining their positions in as many ways as possible and finding common ground (Gilbert 1997a, 70-71). Gilbert also suggests that nondiscursive communications – gestures, tone, emphasis, and so on – clarify and disambiguate verbal or logical communication and thereby support meaning (Gilbert 2001, 244).

Whatever the ideal or real goals of argumentation, expressed emotions help us understand the intentions of arguers as the maieutic effect brings “light” to what Walton describes as “dark-side” commitments or beliefs. Dark-side commitments of one person are not clear to that person (or to others), and the probative operations of argumentation bring them into the discussion in a way that constitutes the maieutic effect (Walton 1992, 220). As an argument proceeds, arguers become more aware of the content of their beliefs and the implications of what they say. The demands of explicitness, which acts as a virtue of argumentation, make arguers less able to remain unconscious of our beliefs and commitments (Govier 1999). The maieutic effect may even help reasoners to confront cognitive biases (Walton 1998). Walton suggests that emotion provides the direction and critical doubt provides the mechanism for the progress of argumentative discussion.

Walton (1992, 1998) indicates that others can only recognize dark-side commitments and make them “light-side” commitments by using empathy. Arguers use such empathy to aid the effectiveness of speculation about what reasons might persuade the other person.

The basis of all persuasive argumentation lies in the choice of suitable initial premises for convincing your respondent through your ability to put yourself inside your opponent’s position in an argument, metaphorically speaking – it is the ability to arrive at presumptive conclusions, concerning your respondent’s commitments in a dialogue. It is based on presumption because,

characteristically, you do not have any direct way of knowing what your respondent's commitments really are in an argumentative exchange. (Walton 1992, 255)

A truly persuasive argument must attend to matters deeper than those made explicit.

Further, Walton echoes the pragma-dialectical school of argumentation theory in viewing critical doubt as an attitude that involves suspension of one's own views in order to take others' views seriously. While critical doubt may seem dispassionate, Walton (1992) suggests it engages empathy, or at least creates conditions conducive to empathy, and this can initiate the unpacking of expressed emotions.

Anger in Argumentation

Anger may be the emotion that most obstructs the progress of reasoning in argumentation, giving good reason to be skeptical about arguments involving anger. Anger's ability to undermine efforts at shared reasoning seems to outstrip any particular fallacy, which may explain why most argumentation theorists ignore it. Yet, we maintain that anger can in particular circumstances help argumentation better fulfill its expressive, persuasive, and epistemic functions, and it can help us to identify the goals of argument and evaluate their importance. After all, argument may have no definitive purpose (Goodwin 2007). The central goals for an argument might not include epistemic values such as empirical adequacy, knowledge, truth, or understanding. But even in cases where the goals of argument are not obviously epistemic, we contend that the maieutic effect of argumentation manifests the epistemological value of anger.

People strongly associate anger with argumentation. In empirical studies anger connects with disagreement (Hample 2012) and both laypeople and argumentation theorists tend to take resolving disagreement to be the point of arguing. The strongest association lies in popular parlance where 'to argue' means to have a verbal fight, such fights often involving anger. Argumentation theorists generally count verbal fights as an 'eristic' form of argument, which specifies the goals of winning. Who wins may be assessed by public favour, or successfully inflicting injury on the other person. Epistemological goals such as knowledge or advancing understanding are not typical, and even when present in eristics they will be secondary to winning. Daniel H. Cohen observes that the irony of eristic argumentation lies in the "loser" learning the most, and so "winning" but in different terms (Cohen 2013; 2003). "It is odd, to say the least, that someone who has become convinced of something in an argument – that is, someone who has gained a new, well-justified and battle-tested belief – is invariably described as the 'loser' of the argument!" (Cohen 2003, 2)

Most disagreement involves opposition not just to claims but to people or their actions, whether or not those people are among the arguers. Disagreement often sparks anger and can encourage further clashes as the discussion proceeds.

Hample notes that “[w]hen the other is personal, aggressive, and rude, an arguer is pressured to respond in kind” (Hample 2012, 138). He explains that this cycle may be less effective for people with certain social identities, such as women, and people with certain character traits, such as low argumentativeness or low verbal aggression.

Communicated anger, regarding some secondary concern, may drag impersonal and only logically opposed positions into emotional territory. Anger can be expressed without a clear object, in which case it can confuse the intended meaning and further escalate the disagreement. The expression of anger suggests an attribution of blame – just as blame motivates anger, so does anger motivate blame (Lerner, Goldberg and Tetlock 1998). While the anger itself may be clear, the direction for the blame and the implication of audience may not be so clear. Whether that anger regards a wrong to oneself or to others, its presence can distract arguers from their primary goals. It can build a disagreement into a fight and may detract from the need to consider the quality of reasons. Whether the fight emerges as physical or remains verbal and becomes a quarrel, the disagreement can become too personal and comprehensively oppositional or even eristic. As Walton argues, “[b]ias and other categories of critical evaluation of argumentation mean little in the quarrel. Argumentation in the quarrel is, by its nature, always strongly biased towards one's own side, and against the point of view of the other side” (Walton 1991, 6). The personal quality of anger puts others off and prevents them from listening, a definite epistemic problem. Anger can indicate single-mindedness in the arguer and engender the same single-mindedness in the audience. It can create a slippery slope into mutual dogmatic antagonism.

Any emotion can be strategically expressed, and it can sometimes swamp other emotional dynamics (Hample 2012). Because so many aspects of anger can be unpleasant and even painful, anger thus can be employed as a weapon. People don't wish to be the object of others' anger and so may walk away from arguments that involve it.

The expression of anger can make the other person fearful, and so it may constitute an argument *ad baculum*, and feigned anger can be used to manipulate audiences. The desire to harm or injure typifies the quarrel dialogue in Walton's account:

The quarrel is typically precipitated by a trivial incident that “sparks” an escalation of emotions, with both parties adopting a stubborn or “childish” attitude... The real purpose of the quarrel is a cathartic release of deeply held emotions so that previously unarticulated feelings can be brought to the surface – feelings that would not be appropriate to bring out for discussion in the course of a normal, polite, public conversation. (Walton 1992, 21)³

³ What counts as politeness may affect the need for such a style of argument dialogue. While the contrast of emotional expression with politeness may be more culturally bound and

The purpose of emotional release proves problematic when other types of dialogue become diverted into quarrel and people end up in a battle instead of in an exercise of mutual persuasion or inquiry into the facts of a matter. Walton (2007) suggests that a shift from critical discussion to quarrel will never be acceptable because a quarrel cannot efficiently achieve the goals of critical discussion. We might demur that shifting to quarrel can be acceptable (imagine someone responding, “all right then, let’s have it out!”). Yet such a shift will certainly pose problems in changing the priorities of the argument and anger can certainly spur that movement toward quarrel.

These effects of anger seem to indicate overwhelming problems for argumentation. However, the strong connection between anger and argument suggests that the relationship cannot be wholly dysfunctional. Anger can inspire argumentation, inviting others to make inferences and gain understanding, and it can anchor and feed how processes of expression, investigation, and learning operate in argumentation. In any dialogical context of argument including the quarrel, we suggest, anger can alert us to the presence of hidden premises and motivate us to make reasons explicit. Anger can provide us with content knowledge of other people’s beliefs and also with information about their level of commitment to these beliefs, the relationships among the person’s beliefs and values, and the depth of disagreement among arguers.

People may express anger through gestures, timing, and other non-explicit means or make anger a direct subject for argumentation. Consider, “I don’t want to go see that movie about climate change as it will make me angry.” This straightforward appeal to undesirable consequences constitute a practical consideration and a move in negotiation that employs an acceptable form of *ad baculum*.

Such emotional knowledge about a person can be valuable for showing their reasons to others and making an inference ‘inviting.’ Gilbert argues that “[e]motions expressed during argument provide information that can play a crucial role in determining the acceptability of a premiss. Someone exhibiting anger or sadness when uttering a premiss indicates the degree to which the premiss is important, the role it plays in the argument, or a reaction to a received message” (Gilbert 2004, 252). The expressed passion itself – in addition to the content that can be teased out of it – serves the persuasive functions of argument. Walton recognizes this too: “Detachment from emotions is not always a good thing in argumentation. In many instances, in order to make a convincing case, it is important to show a passionate conviction” (Walton 1992, 268). Gilbert’s view retains a strength over Walton’s view on this matter, however, in recognizing that displays of passionate conviction can convey epistemically relevant content.

gendered than Walton recognizes, we consider it important that he acknowledges both the role of emotion in starting ‘the quarrel’ and the role of ‘the quarrel’ in helping people process emotion.

For arguers who desire to persuade in argumentation, expressing anger can help their audiences to recognize the inference intended by the arguer and the coherence of the arguer's claim with their deeper orientation to values and facts about the world that provide the basis for the inference. Expressing anger can help previously ignored, suppressed, or unseen information become salient. Anger can encourage inference by providing information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that might otherwise remain implicit or be prematurely dismissed.

The information about the arguer that anger conveys includes that person's moral sensibilities, values, and judgements. All these help us to trace the arguer's inferences and understand the background considerations that warrant those inferences. Arguers can learn about their own and each other's reasoning even when they fail to persuade each other, fail to negotiate an exchange, or fail to find out the truth of the central matter. The sorts of things we can learn from anger in argumentation include the revelation of social biases operating as hidden premises and implicit assumptions. Anger's communication about values and expectations can provide an opportunity to make injustice explicit.

Whether express or implicit, insofar as anger can function as a psychological defense mechanism, it can serve as a sign of other mental states and psychological needs. For example, anger can protect reasoners from painful emotions such as shame, guilt, rejection, and hurt, as a 'cover-up' emotion or defensive reaction. It can also prevent people from experiencing feelings of vulnerability, which people may want to avoid given that they can be painful and frightening (Pascual-Leone et al. 2013; Seltzer 2013). Anger may quite literally provide a measure of pain relief: norepinephrine, one of the key hormones released in anger, has analgesic effects. The righteousness of anger may thus help us to avoid painful feelings as well as taking genuine responsibility for our feelings, actions, and reactions. Anger may also serve as "a socially acceptable mask for many of the more difficult underlying emotions we feel" (Brown 2012, 34).

These findings suggest that the most epistemically interesting propositional or factual content in anger belongs actually to the emotions *underlying* the anger. Arguers can therefore learn a great deal about the implicit content of an argument through consideration of emotions associated with angry responses, such as hurt, shame, embarrassment, grief, or fear. The informational content belonging specifically to anger may in some cases be secondary and involve ideas about wrongdoing or defensive or offensive reactions focused on redress. Because anger draws attention away from any underlying emotions that may be in play, it can hide content having moral, psychological and epistemological significance that argumentation helps to reveal. Arguers, however, may need to exercise caution before digging into that deeper argumentative content if anger is serving a protective function.

Discovering what anger conceals and identifying the defensive and offensive maneuvers involved comes from recognizing anger as expression or communication. Whether anger seems to be a protective 'cover-up' emotion or a defensive communicative reaction, it connects a complex array of interpersonal factors, not to mention beliefs and assumptions about how others should behave and what they should think. The display of anger can show conviction, frustration, determination, and moral orientation in a way that exceeds the content of specific factual claims and provides a holistic picture of the person expressing the anger. Anger often expresses more than cognitive states and propositional content.

Walton and Gilbert more than any other argumentation scholars stress the value of unearthing the background beliefs and goals of arguers and accept the role of emotion in this regard. Walton suggests that "the critical function of argumentation can act as a corrective or balance to the steering function of emotions" (Walton 1995, 257). This process appears less antagonistic and more constructively complementary when Walton describes the rules and procedures of discussion shaping feelings into a form that allows them to be articulated to oneself and to others in a way that grounds the maieutic effect (Walton 1995, 258). Walton suggests specifically that argumentation allows hidden grievances to be "expressed explicitly in order to make possible the smooth continuance of a personal relationship" (Walton 1995, 109). Sharing emotions on his pragmatic account therefore seems to serve what Gilbert describes as "face goals" at the same time as serving the "task goals" of expressing feelings and articulating grievances. Anger can foster certain moral virtues in the context of a dispute, including face goals such as the cementing of friendship and community, at least in the context of long-term relationships where grievances need resolution (Walton 1992, 202).

Even in the case of quarrels, anger may have epistemic potential. Walton (1998) only recognizes that the quarrel serves to "air" disagreements and "bring them to the surface." Expression and articulation presented this way provide at most a neutralizing or cathartic effect rather than a positive contribution to reasoning because quarrels operate primarily in what Gilbert calls the emotional mode. Yet Walton hints at some of the epistemological benefits we have in mind when he discusses how quarrels serve the face goals of building interpersonal relationships.

By allowing powerful feelings to be expressed through the articulation of deeply held grievances, the quarrel can improve mutual understanding and cement the bonds of a personal relationship. A quarrel can split two people apart, but if it has a good cathartic effect, it can function as a substitute for physical fighting and draw people closer together in the course of a meaningful relationship. (Walton 1992, 22)

The mention of understanding here suggests that epistemological benefits can be part of a quarrel's mechanisms. Quarrels can help us realize what other people

consider important (Walton 1995), which may benefit from how anger can make strong arguments persuasive and motivate attentive listening, as we saw above from psychology.

Quarrels can also help people understand themselves better because as arguers they strain to articulate values, concerns, and commitments. Walton points out that “[h]eeding your emotions in argumentation can, in general, be a good guide to keeping in harmony with your deepest, fundamental commitments, which define your personal stance or considered judgement as an individual” (Walton 1992, 257).

Understanding another person’s motivations and one’s own as they unfold in arguments or other discourse has value in itself, we suggest. The expression of anger provides a moral response to another person or situation, giving information about the arguer as a person experiencing offense, and about the object of the anger. The target of the anger may not be the audience, but other people, institutions, and situations, and the expression may serve to bond people who share the anger or sense of injustice. As Lorde observes, “[p]art of my anger is always libation for my fallen sisters” (Lorde 1984, 129). In such a case, the anger carries information about the world and wrongs experienced there.

Part of the strategic value of anger in argument lies in providing a global perspective on oneself that can help the other person understand where the priorities lie that shape the arguer’s viewpoint. Understanding others has epistemic value in itself, but there is more to be said about the value of taking others seriously. It can require believing what people say, acknowledging the validity of their experience, and thus cultivating their epistemic and argumentative agency (Bondy 2010; Fricker 2007; Dotson 2011; Townley 2009; 2011). The epistemic dimensions of this process also occasionally arouse anger, such as when epistemic norms are violated in the course of argument or when reasoners believe that epistemic goals are subverted through falsity or insufficient evidence. Taking others seriously and having empathy need not require agreeing with others’ judgements or accepting the blame attributed. Sometimes disagreement, even angry disagreement, can be a sign that arguers are engaging other’s views fully, showing epistemic and moral respect – and indeed, in some cultural contexts, failing to show anger can signal disrespect and dismissal of the issues at hand (Schiffrin 1984).

While we suggest that anger can point to certain truths about beliefs, goals, and values, Gilbert argues (2004, 250) that the evaluation of the emotional message in an argument does not involve its truth but whether it is genuine or counterfeit. He allows there are strong parallels between emotional and propositional content. In both cases, argumentative assessment includes: (1) is it being sent correctly? (2) is it being received correctly? (3) is it true (genuine)? and, (4) is the inference of suppressed premises or unexpressed emotions justified? (Gilbert 2004, 251) These criteria for assessing the relevance of emotional considerations run parallel to those for assessing the relevance of

premises or claims: emotions may be exaggerated or emphasized appropriately or inappropriately, just like facts; and are equally subject to assessment via argumentation (Gilbert 2004, 252-256). Sara Ahmed also advises that anger not be treated as a “site of truth” (Ahmed 2010). Emotions may be feigned or stressed appropriately or inappropriately, just like facts (Gilbert 2004, 252-256). We would add that they can also be misunderstood, perhaps more than most argumentative content.

Gilbert and Ahmed need to account, however, for how emotions cohere or clash with what gets articulated in the logical mode of truths and falsehoods. Gilbert recognizes that the emotional and logical mode can conflict and that such opposition can be assessed using certain inferential principles (Gilbert 2001). Should the audience identify dissonance between the information signaled by emotions and the explicit content of an argument, he argues they may assume that an implicit emotional factor played a significant role. The audience may assess that an arguer’s logically articulated commitments do not reflect their true perspective, and so the emotional information trumps prior considerations. “In that case, one must turn to non-logical techniques relying upon the tools human communicators normally use when interacting” (Gilbert 2001, 240). The emotional information thus can prove more veridical than the logical. Should there appear no conflict, then reasoners can integrate emotional information as truths into the contents of our understanding – not an easy task, but an epistemologically valuable one.

The epistemological value of anger in argumentation depends therefore on the operation of critical doubt and that is radically different from the skeptical doubt that the expression of anger can also prompt. Critical doubt propels the progress of reason in argumentation and can help us to recognize anger’s epistemological potential, prompting us to ask questions about the significance of anger and its role in the arguer’s reasoning. Yet critical doubt involves passion too: empathy for the angry person. To recommend such empathy, however, does not extend sympathy to misogynists or other people ‘punching down’ in policing oppressive hierarchies. That response would reinforce the ignorance on which the arrogant perception depends (Lugones 1987; Manne 2018). So, Manne advises that here the “liberal impulse is therefore misplaced... unless we want to get stuck feeding the need monster forever” (Manne 2018, 290). The anger that protects privilege involves entitlement, and that does not interface with critical doubt in the way necessary for significant epistemological value.

Conclusion

The complexity of anger includes different forms dependent both on how it arises and on various directions it takes towards a person or other object. Attending to this complexity is important, for while there are reasons to be skeptical about the ability of anger to contribute epistemically to argumentation, some of these reasons are rooted in an overly simplistic and monolithic view of

anger. We contend that certain forms of anger, such as recognition respect, political, and institutional anger, have goals beyond revenge and are able to contribute more to argumentation epistemically than is generally appreciated. On this view, anger can improve argument analysis, enhance critical doubt, and emphasize the salience of premises by signaling their relative importance. Anger can motivate arguers to travel empathetically between different positions and the various subjectivities and worldviews that accompany them. Anger can bring into awareness the goals of argument for different arguers and thereby promote increased understanding and conflict resolution. Anger can also signal the presence of implicit premises and contextual factors and motivate us to identify and address them.

For these reasons, it is important to regard anger as a source of potential epistemic value in argumentation and commit to the work of using anger to excavate knowledge and insight. While anger can be painful, awkward, and challenging to work with, there are ways to manage anger skillfully so that its maieutic benefits are realized, and its more harmful aspects are minimized. When reasoners direct anger not toward others in the conversation or even to their ideas, but rather toward a shared concern, anger can even inspire the collaborative building of arguments and relationships. Given the possibilities that this new approach to anger in argumentation presents, epistemologists and argumentation researchers have much to explore regarding how anger operates in specific forms of argumentation and different dialogical contexts.

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